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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (2009) and Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) 
(2009) confers jurisdiction on this Court. 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-802 ("Duty of loyalty") 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Phillip, as trustee, divided the assets of his parents' Trust between himself and 
Robert Milner, one of his two brothers, but decided not to distribute any Trust assets to 
his third brother, Tracy. All three brothers were equal beneficiaries of the Trust. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 213 (Oct. 9, 2009)(R. 1066-1075). 
Phillip's decision to deny Tracy a Trust distribution was based on Phillip's interpretation 
of a document from Tracy purporting to waive and assign to Phillip Tracy's interest in 
the Trust and Phillip's interpretation of statements in two letters written by Tracy. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 6134, 8-9 Hf 8-11 (Oct. 9, 2009)(R. 1066-
1075) 
Tracy contends that Phillip unreasonably relied on the waiver document because it 
failed to satisfy the disclaimer statute, because statements in Tracy's two letters confirm 
that Tracy did not intend to waive his Trust interest, because the Trust Agreement 
prohibited any assignment of a Trust interest, and because Phillip's conclusion to exclude 
Tracy was self-serving and fails to protect the Tracy's interest as a beneficiary. 
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II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Tracy Southwick filed his complaint on January 4, 2006. (R. 1-26.) A two-day 
bench trial was conducted before district court Judge Ben H. Hadfield on June 16-17, 
2009. (R. 1004-1009.) Following the bench trial, Judge Hadfield concluded that Tracy 
Southwick was an equal beneficiary of the Trust (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law at 2 , f 3 (Oct. 9, 2009)(R. 1066-1075); that Phillip Southwick had not breached his 
fiduciary duty to Tracy Southwick (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9, f^ 12 
(Oct. 9, 2009)(R. 1066-1075); and, that even though Tracy Southwick was a beneficiary, 
he was equitably estopped from receiving a portion of a year 2005 Trust distribution 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9,1f 14 (Oct. 9, 2009)(R. 1066-1075). Tracy 
Southwick filed his Notice of Appeal of the Court's Order and Judgment. (R. 1082-
1083.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In September 1989, Don B. Southwick and Barbara P. Southwick executed a Trust 
Agreement (the "Trust Agreement") forming the Don B. Southwick and Barbara P. 
Southwick Irrevocable Trust. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2 Tf 1 (Oct. 9, 
2009)(R. 1066-1075))(R. 17-24, 1008; Plaintiffs' Trial Ex. 1.) 
Phillip served as Trustee of the Trust since its inception. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law at 2 ^ 5.) Phillip and his brothers Tracy and Robert Milner are the 
three beneficiaries of the Trust. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2 f 3.)(R. 
1067.); (Order and Judgment at 2 f 5)(R. 1025). 
2 
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On or about January 31, 1992, Tracy signed a document purporting to disclaim his 
interest in the Trust, and purporting to transfer his interest to Phillip (the "Waiver and 
Assignment"). (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 3 f 15)(R. 
1068)(Defendant's Trial Ex. 6.) The Trust Agreement prohibits any beneficiary from 
transferring or assigning their interest in the Trust. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law at 2 H 3.)(R. 1067.); (Trust Agreement Art. 5: "Spendthrift Provision") (R. 22.) 
Barbara Southwick told Phillip that she wanted the Trust assets to be distributed 
only to Phillip and Robert Milner.l (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 5 U 
26.)(R. 1070.) 
Tracy testified that in the summer of 2001 he spoke to Phillip to inquire about his 
(Tracy's) interest in the Trust and Phillip told Tracy that Tracy no longer had an interest 
in the Trust because of the Waiver and Assignment, but Tracy refuted signing the Waiver 
and Assignment. (R. 1091) (Tr. 72:4-13, 25-73:25); (R. 1091)(Tr. p. 205: 15-19.) 
On February 24, 2002, Barbara Southwick died, at which time the Trust directed 
that the Trust assets be distributed equally between Phillip, Robert and Tracy. (Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2 If 1, 3; 5 1f 29.)(R. 1067, 1070.) (Plaintiffs' Trial Ex. 
1.) 
After Barbara Southwick's death and funeral in 2002, Tracy wrote Phillip a letter 
dated April 7, 2002, (and Tracy wrote a similar letter to Robert Milner, dated April 20, 
1
 Barbara Southwick was Tracy Southwick's step-mother, and she received her 
husband's, Don Southwick's, interest in the Trust and became its sole beneficiary (with 
Phillip, Tracy and Robert as contingent beneficiaries) pursuant to a divorce decree. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2 ^  8.)(R. 1067.) 
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2002) wherein Tracy stated that Tracy did not remember whether or not he signed the 
Waiver and Assignment, that he was not going to do anything about the Trust, and that 
Phillip and Robert could do anything they wanted with the Trust assets. (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law at 5-6 fflf 30-31.)(see Addendum B) (R. 1070-71.) (Def. Trial 
Exs. 7-8). 
In his letters, Tracy also stated: 
To Phillip: "I have one question for you, brother. Do you think that I, or anybody 
else, for that matter, would intentionally and knowingly sign away their 
inheritance? No. And neither would you." Id. 
To Robert: "Do you think I would intentionally sign away my inheritance? Would 
you? I don't know of anybody that would." Id. 
Phillip testified that when he received Tracy's April 2002 letter that he had 
previously spoken with Tracy and Tracy confirmed his belief that he (Tracy) was still a 
beneficiary of the Trust. (R. 1091)(Tr.p. 205: 15-19.) Phillip also testified that he never 
spoke with Tracy about Tracy's statements in Tracy's April 2002 letter. (R. 1091) (Tr. p. 
207.) 
Phillip considered the Waiver and Assignment and Tracy's April 2002 letters as 
confirmation of Tracy's intent to disclaim his interest in the Trust. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law at 8 If 8) (R. 1073); (R. 1091) (Tr. p. 254.) 
SLC_664350.1 
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On or about March 9, 2005, Phillip sold the Trust's property in Lehi, Utah for 
$300,000 and divided the proceeds equally between himself (Phillip) and Robert Milner. 
(PI. Tr. Ex. 15) (R. 1008); (R. 1091)(Tr. at p. 171-172). 
Tracy received no distribution from the sale of the Lehi, Utah property. Id. 
The trial court concluded that Phillip's reliance on Tracy's statements would 
operate to Phillip's detriment if Tracy was allowed to assert that he did not renounce his 
interest in the Trust or that he did not renounce his claim to an interest in the Trust assets. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9 ^ f 11.) (R. 1074.) 
The trial court concluded that Tracy was estopped from asserting that prior to 
filing the Complaint that he did not renounce his interest in the Trust. (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law at 9114.) (R. 1074.); (Order and Judgment at 211-3)(R. 1025). 
The trial court concluded that the Waiver and Assignment did not comply with the 
applicable disclaimer statute in force in 1992, Utah Code § 75-2-802 (1991). (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9 f 15.) (R. 191, 1074.) (see Utah Code § 75-2-802 
(1991) attached as Addendum C.) 
The trial court concluded that Tracy is entitled as a beneficiary of the Trust to 
receive his one-third share of the remaining assets in the Trust. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law at 9 f 16.) (R. 1074.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Phillip breached his duty of loyalty when he interpreted the Waiver and 
Assignment and Tracy's statements in Tracy's two April 2002 letters in a way that 
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benefited himself (Phillip) and not Tracy, by concluding that Tracy desired to waive or 
disclaim his (Tracy's) interest in the trust, and by dividing the Trust assets (including 
Tracy's share) between himself (Phillip) and his other brother, Robert. 
Appellants' position is that it was unreasonable and a breach of Phillip's fiduciary 
duty to disregard Tracy's interest in the Trust by relying on a legally ineffective Waiver 
and Assignment and to rely on statements in Tracy's two letters, and where Phillip was 
relying on his mother's (Barbara's) desire that Tracy receive no assets from the Trust, 
and where Tracy confirmed on the phone and in his two letters that he would "not sign 
away his inheritance," and where Phillip made no effort to contact Tracy after receiving 
the letters to determine Tracy's intent, prior to Phillip's dividing the proceeds from the 
sale of Trust assets between himself (Phillip) and his brother, Robert Milner. 
Lack of Detrimental Reliance 
Appellants' contend that Tracy Southwick should not be estopped from receiving 
his share of the prior Trust distribution because Phillip would not be injured if he were 
ordered to return Tracy's share of the Trust distribution to Tracy because Phillip was 
never entitled to Tracy share of the Trust assets, and there is no evidence supporting the 
trial court's conclusion of detrimental reliance by Phillip. 
The trial court's August 18, 2009, Order and Judgment should be vacated, and 




I. THE COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT TRACY'S 
BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN THE TRUST WAS NOT 
TERMINATED. 
A. The Disclaimer did not Substantially Comply with Utah's Disclaimer 
Statute. 
Phillip acknowledges that the Disclaimer document at issue does not satisfy the 
four part test outlined in the Utah Disclaimer Statute. See Appellee's Brief at 16-17. 
Instead, Phillip argues that Tracy "substantially" complied with the statute; but Phillip's 
position was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court, which concluded that validity of a 
disclaimer depends on whether the disclaimer strictly complies with the Utah Disclaimer 
Statute enforceable at the time the disclaimer was executed. See Whitney v. Faulkner, 
2004 UT 52, P14; 95 P.3d 270 ("one who wishes to take advantage of the [disclaimer] 
statute's provisions ... must comply with its terms."). The Utah Supreme Court stated 
that "substantial complain[ce]" with this disclaimer statute, rather than strict compliance, 
"simply ignores both the language of the statute and of the document..." Whitney. 2004 
UT 52, P14 (referring to Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-801 (Supp. 2003). The Court further 
stated that the "plain language" of provisions (l)(b)(l) and (l)(b)(2) "requires that a 
disclaimer 'describe the property or interest disclaimed' and 'declare the disclaimer and 
extent thereof." Whitney v. Faulkner. 2004 UT 52, f 13, 95 P.3d 270. Thus, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the phrase "describe" and "declare" required a definite 
statement. Likewise, Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-802(l)(b)(iv)(1991) requires a definite 
statement that the document "is proper under Subsection (4)..." Phillip should not be 
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allowed to rests on "substantial" compliance and thereby subvert his fiduciary duties to 
Tracy as a trust beneficiary, for Phillip's personal benefit. 
B. Tracy did not Waive his Beneficial Interest 
Phillip incorrectly argues the Utah Disclaimer Statute by citing to its language 
limiting its application to testamentary dispositions. Phillip argues that the statute opens 
the door to alternative means of disclaiming testamentary transfers; this would render the 
statute meaningless. See Appellee's Brief at 19-20. The Utah Disclaimer Statute deals 
specifically with testamentary dispositions and the introductory language cited by Phillip 
applies to transfers and dispositions other than those described under this statute. 
Furthermore, Phillip cannot refer to Tracy's letters as a waiver of his beneficial interest 
because the letters have language that contradict Phillip's claim that Tracy intended to 
relinquish his interest: 
To Phillip: "I have one question for you, brother. Do you think that I, or anybody 
else, for that matter, would intentionally and knowingly sign away their 
inheritance? No. And neither would you." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law at 5-6 fflf 30-31.)(see Appellee's Brief Addendum E-F) (R. 1070-71.) (Def. 
Trial Exs. 7-8). 
To Robert: "Do you think I would intentionally sign away my inheritance? Would 
you? I don't know of anybody that would." Id. 
SLC_664350.1 
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C. Tracy Did Not Consent to Modifying the Irrevocable Trust 
The Disclaimer document makes no reference to any modification or amendment 
of the irrevocable trust at issue. Phillip argues that somehow Tracy's signature on the 
Disclaimer also worked as an acknowledgement to Don's and Barbara's joint 
modification to their trust pursuant to their divorce. See Appellee's Brief at 21-22. 
However, because Tracy did not agree to any such trust modification, and the Disclaimer 
document is not a consent to any modification, the trust amendment does not affect 
Tracy's interest. Clayton v. Behle, 565 P.2d 1132, 1133 (Utah 1977) (a trust may be 
modified only "where all the beneficiaries thereof consent"); see also Nolan v. 
Hoopiiana, 2006 UT 53, f 30, 144 P.3d 1129 (stating that at trust may be revoked "only if 
and to the extent such power is explicitly reserved by the terms of the trust" (internal 
quotation omitted)). Restrictions on amending trusts are further explained in Banks v. 
Means: 
It is well settled that "[a] trust is a form of ownership in which the legal title to 
property is vested in a trustee, who has equitable duties to hold and manage it for 
the benefit of the beneficiaries." . . . "Once the settlor has created the trust he is no 
longer the owner of the trust property and has only such ability to deal with it as is 
expressly reserved to him in the trust instrument." . . . Thus, a settlor has the 
power to modify or revoke a trust only if and to the extent that such power is 
explicitly reserved by the terms of the t r u s t . . . Furthermore, "the creation of a 
trust involves the transfer of property interests in the trust subject-matter to the 
beneficiaries. These interests cannot be taken from [the beneficiaries] except in 
accordance with a provision of the trust instrument." 2002 UT 65,19, 52 P.3d 
1190 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). 
This principle was reaffirmed in 2003 in In re Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589, where the 
Court stated "a settlor has the power to modify a trust only if and to the extent that such a 
power was reserved by the terms of the trust." Here, the Trust is irrevocable and 
9 
unamendable. See Appellee's Addendum A: Trust Agreement, Art. II. The Utah 
Supreme Court stated further that "[t]he transfer of property interests to the beneficiaries 
'cannot be taken from them except in accordance with a provision of the trust instrument 
. . . . ' " Id. 1HI12, 13, quoting George G. Bogert & George T Bogert, Trusts & Trustees § 
998 (2d ed. rev. 1983). See Kline v. Department of Health, 776 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (a trustor has the power to modify a trust only if and to the extent that such a 
power was reserved by the terms of the trust, citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 331 
(1959)). 
Without consent by Tracy, Don and Barbara's amendment to the Trust could not 
adversely affect Tracy's beneficial interest. See In re Flake, supra. Without any 
evidence of Tracy's alleged consent to the Trust amendment, Tracy remains a beneficiary 
in the Trust and is entitled to his beneficial interest in the Trust's assets. 
1. Language of the Trust Amendment Does Not Affect Tracy. 
Even if Tracy's consent was not required, the Trust amendment had no effect on 
Tracy's interest. While the Divorce Decree opened the door to the amendment, 
ultimately, the joint modification language fell short of affecting Tracy's interest. 
Specifically, Don and Barbara agreed to: 
"remove Don B. Southwick as a beneficiary under the terms of that 
Trust Agreement and to designate Barbara P. Southwick as the sole 
beneficiary under the terms of the Trust Agreement." See 
Appellee's Addendum C: Trust Amendment Letter Agreement. 
This "amendment" does not adversely affect any beneficiary other than Don, and merely 
transfers Don's interest to Barbara. No mention is made of affecting any other interests 
10 
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in the Trust. No revocation, altering, shifting, modifying or amending of Phillip's, 
Robert's or Tracy's contingent interests is mentioned. Tracy remains a beneficiary in the 
Trust and is entitled to his beneficial interest in the Trust's assets. 
II. PHILLIP BREACHED HIS DUTY OF LOYALTY BY BENEFITING 
HIMSELF AT HIS BROTHER'S EXPENSE. 
Phillip argues that he did not breach his fiduciary duty because he "acted 
reasonably" as the Trustee. See Appellee's Brief at 34. Phillip acknowledges that after 
he received the Disclaimer, Tracy "assert[ed] his interest or claim to the Trust." See 
Appellee's Brief at 30. Knowing Tracy claimed an interest in the Trust, Phillip points to 
Tracy's letters as confirmation that Tracy walked away from his interest in the Trust. Id. 
But, Phillip makes no reference to the statements in Tracy's letters where Tracy writes: 
"I have one question for you, brother. Do you think that I, or anybody else, for that 
matter, would intentionally and knowingly sign away their inheritance? No. And neither 
would you." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 5-6 fflf 30-31.)(see Appellee's 
Addendum E-F) (R. 1070-71.) (Def. Trial Exs. 7-8). 
Phillip is claiming that it was reasonable for him to rely on the letters but they 
include the statements that Tracy would not walk away or sign away his interest in the 
Trust (his "inheritance"). If the Court approved Phillip's decision it would open the door 
to trustees making self-serving judgment calls on anything that could benefit them which 
disregards the trustee's duty to protect the beneficiary, and place the beneficiary's interest 
before the trustee's. Wheeler v. Mann, 763 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1988) (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 170, at 312 (4th ed. 1987)) (the trustee must 
11 
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"administer the trust 'solely in the interest of the beneficiary,'" and may not "place 
himself in a position where it would be for his own benefit to violate his duty to its 
beneficiaries"). 
III. RETURNING TRACY'S SHARE OF THE TRUST IS NOT A 
DETRIMENT. 
It is not a detriment to Phillip to require him to return money that he was not 
entitled to receive. Phillip's only example of a detriment is being required to return Trust 
funds and paying them to Tracy, and being personally liable to do so. See Appellee's 
Brief at 29-33. Yet, Phillip points to no law where disgorging a portion of a distribution 
improperly made by a trustee to himself is a detriment—and Tracy has found none. 
Phillip also claims that he would suffer a detriment if the sale price of the Lehi property 
is subject to question (Appellee's Brief at 30), but Phillip presented evidence at trial that 
the sale price: $300,000, was the actual value of the property sold. (R. 1091)(Tr. p. 220-
222.). 
Tracy's appeal of this issue is not a challenge to the trial court's findings of fact, 
but is only an appeal of its conclusion of law that Tracy is precluded from sharing in the 
Trust's single distribution because of estoppel, which requires that the Court conclude 
that Phillip would suffer a detriment if he had to return Tracy's share of the Trust 
distribution. 
IV. THE DIVORCE DECREE DID NOT AFFECT TRACY'S BENEFICIAL 
INTEREST. 
Phillip proposes the alternative theory that the Court's judgment may be affirmed 
by looking to the Divorce Decree of the settlors, and confirming that Phillip properly 
12 
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relied on this Decree in acting as Trustee. This theory fails for multiple reasons of both 
fact and law. 
A. The Divorce Decree Did Not Amend the Trust 
The language of the Divorce Decree reads out of "both sides of its mouth." The 
Decree states that the parties shall give written notice to the Trustee to do whatever is 
necessary to make "[Barbara] the sole beneficiary of the assets of the Trust as her sole 
and separate property" but also states that "[Barbara] shall be the recipient and the sole 
beneficiary under the Trust Agreement." See Appellee's Addendum C: Divorce Decree, 
p. 3. Interestingly, the Decree does nothing more than direct the divorcing parties—Don 
and Barbara—to work together to amend the Trust. Nowhere does the Decree itself 
purport to amend the Trust. Alternatively, if the Decree directs the Trustee to amend the 
Trust, the result is the same, the Decree does not amend the Trust, but instead gives 
conflicting instructions to the Trustee. Regardless, whether the Decree directs Don and 
Barbara or the Trustee, it does not amend the Trust or affect Tracy's beneficial interest. 
B. The Divorce Decree Could Not Amend the Trust 
Utah Supreme Court Justice Dallin H. Oaks, writing for the majority, said it best, 
that a district court has no authority, in a divorce proceeding, "to alter property rights 
already vested in other parties, such as in the children who are the beneficiaries of [a] 
trust." Sundquistv. Sundquist 639 P.2d 181, 186 (Utah 1981). Justice Oaks further 
clarified that the district court only has power "to reallocate property rights between the 
parties to the divorce." Id. This opinion grew from a case that held a district court's 
decree cannot incorporate the parents' stipulation to terminate a child's right to child 
13 
support. Hill v. Hill 638 P.2d 516 (Utah 1981) (A child's interest in property cannot be 
"bartered away, extinguished, estopped or in any way defeated by the agreement or 
conduct of the parents."). Here, neither Don nor Barbara could have 'bartered away' 
Tracy's right to his beneficial interest in the Trust. And, even if it was their intent— 
which it was not—the Court's decree could not have incorporated or imposed this 
agreement. 
Justice Oaks added, citing Clayton v. Behle, 565 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1977), that a 
trust amendment (in Clayton a termination) requires that "[a]ll beneficiaries must 
consent." Sundquist 639 P.2d at 187. In Sundquist, trust termination was prevented 
where two "children of the parties" did not object to the proposed trust termination but 
failed to provide their consent, and without this "affirmative" consent the trust could not 
be altered (terminated) and the childrens' interests could not be extinguished. Id. 
Similarly, here, without Tracy's consent neither the Court nor the parents could 
extinguish his interest in the irrevocable Trust. 
C. The Divorce Decree Could Not Have Terminated Tracy's 
Interest Without His Consent. 
Even if the language of the Decree is seen as amending the irrevocable Trust, the 
Court did not have the authority to impact Tracy's interest without Tracy's consent (and 
there is no evidence of such consent). Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-411(5) (a court may 
modify an irrevocable trust without the consent of the beneficiary only if the court 
determines that the interests of the nonconsenting beneficiary will be adequately 
protected). Admittedly, this section of Utah's code, enacted in 2004, post-dates the 
14 
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Decree; however, this statute was undoubtedly born from earlier principles and policies 
on this issue in Utah and throughout the country. Beilev v. Beilev, 398 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 
Ct. App. 1981) (citing six additional jurisdictions for guidance). 
In Beiley, a divorce decree was entered which ordered an amendment of an 
irrevocable trust. Beilev, 398 So. 2d 932. The issue on appeal was whether or not the 
court could order, via divorce decree, an amendment to an irrevocable trust without the 
consent of a beneficiary. Id. Ultimately, the court held that an amendment to an 
irrevocable trust without the consent of a beneficiary (there, a son), could occur where the 
son's interest was not impaired by the amendment. Id. at 934 ("Although Florida cases 
have not previously addressed this issue, we now hold that an irrevocable trust may be 
amended without the consent of the beneficiary when the settlor surrenders privileges or 
rights in favor of the beneficiary.")(emphasis supplied). 
Here, the divorce court dealt with a division of property between spouses—Don 
and Barbara—pursuant to a divorce. When an agreement was reached between the 
parties, including a transfer of Don's interest in the Trust to Barbara, the Court entered 
the Decree confirming their agreement and directing this Trust amendment be 
accomplished. Accordingly, the Decree did not affect Tracy's beneficial interest in the 
Trust. Even if the Decree did affect Tracy's interest, there is no evidence that Tracy 
consented to this proposed property division, to the transfer of Don's interest in the Trust, 
or to the alleged termination of Tracy's interest and therefore any amendment caused by 
the Decree terminating Tracy's interest without his consent would be improper. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Appellants and Cross-Appellees respectfully request an 
order vacating and reversing the trial court's August 18, 2009, Order and Judgment and 
finding that Phillip Southwick breached his fiduciary duty to Tracy Southwick and that 
Tracy Southwick can assert his claim for his equal share of the Trust assets prior to the 
date the Complaint was filed; denying Appellee's Cross Appeal; and remanding for a 
determination of damages for Tracy Southwick in an amount equal to Tracy Southwick's 
share of the Trust distributions prior to filing the Complaint; and such additional relief as 
the court deems appropriate. 
DATED: August 23, 2010. 
latthew G^orimmer 
ErinT. Middleton 
Durham Jones & Pinegar 
torneys for Appellants 
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